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ABSTRACT. Despite the pervasiveness of the efficient markets paradigm in the academic fi-
nance literature, the use of various moving average (MA) trading rules remains popular with
financial market practitioners. This paper proposes a stochastic dynamic financial market model
in which demand for traded assets has both a fundamentalist and a chartist component. The
chartist demand is governed by the difference between current price and a (long-run) MA. Our
simulations show that the MA is a source of market instability, and the interaction of the MA
and market noises can lead to the tendency for the market price to take long excursions away
from the fundamental. The model reveals various market price phenomena, the coexistence of
apparent market efficiency and a large chartist component, price resistance levels, long memory
and skewness and kurtosis of returns.
JEL classifications: D83, D84, E21, E32, C60.
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Despite all the evidence presented in academic journals that security prices follow random
walks, and consequently that these security markets are at least weak-form efficient, as defined
in [10], the use of technical trading rules still seems to be widespread amongst financial market
practitioners. Technical analysts, also known as “chartists”, attempt to forecast future prices by
the study of patterns of past prices and a few other related summary statistics about security
trading. Basically, they believe that shifts in supply and demand can be detected in charts of
market movements. There have been various studies (see [1, 2, 4, 15]) of the use and profitability
of technical analysis, we refer the reader to [14] for an up-to-date survey.
If one remains within the efficient market paradigm there is little scope to introduce appar-
ently “irrational” traders using technical analysis. One strand of literature that does leave some
room for such “irrational” agents is that of heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) of financial
markets, see for example [9, 5, 3, 6, 7] and the recent surveys [11, 12] and the many references
therein. [8] have recently proposed a simple behavioural HAM with a group of fundamentalists
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and a group of chartists using a (long-run) moving average (MA) rule similar to the rules used
in financial practice. The technical analysts are assumed to react to buy-sell signals generated
by the difference between a long-run and a short-run MA. Both types of traders are boundedly
rational in the sense that, based on a fitness measure given by realized capital gains, traders
switch from strategies with low fitness to ones with high fitness. It is found that the stability
properties of the underlying deterministic model can be characterized by the reaction coeffi-
cient of the fundamentalists, the extrapolation rate of the chartists, the intensity of choice to
switching strategies, and the lag length used for the MA. This paper extends the analysis to the
corresponding stochastic model and analyze the stability properties and dynamic behaviour of
the model, particularly in relation to the MA trading strategies, and the potential for the model
to generate phenomenon such as long deviations of the price from its fundamental, the coexis-
tence of apparent market efficiency and a large chartist component, price resistance levels, long
memory and skewness and kurtosis of returns.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We first introduce the model and briefly review the local
stability and bifurcations of the fundamental steady state of the deterministic model. We then
introduce stochastic fundamental price and noise-trader demand processes, and examine the
effect of these noise processes when the prices of the corresponding deterministic system are
switching between bull and bear markets. This non-linear stochastic model illustrates a range
of phenomena observed in real markets.
Consider an asset pricing model with only one risky asset. Let Pt be the price (cum dividend)
per share of the risky asset at time t. Let nh,t be the market fraction of type h traders at time t
with h = f (fundamentalists) and c (chartists) and nf,t + nc,t = 1. Let the excess demand for
the risky asset of representative trader of type h at time t be Dht . Then the population weighted
aggregate excess demand at time t is given by Dt = nf,tDft + nc,tDct . We assume that prices
are set each period via a market maker who adjusts the price according to





where D˜t ∼ N (0, σ2t ) captures a random excess demand process either driven by unexpected
news about fundamentals, or representing noise created by noise traders, σt ≥ 0 and the pa-
rameter μ > 0 measures the speed of price adjustment (or the aggregate risk tolerance) of the
market maker to the excess demand.
The fundamentalists believe that the market price should be given by the fundamental price
that they have estimated based on various types of fundamental information, such as earnings,
general economic forecasts and so forth. They buy/sell the stock when the current price is
below/above the fundamental price. For simplicity, we first assume that1 the fundamental price
is a positive constant P ∗ and the average excess demand of the fundamentalists is given by
Dft = α(P
∗ − Pt), where the parameter α > 0 is a combined measure of the aggregate risk
tolerance of the fundamentalists and their reaction to the mis-pricing.
For the technical analysts, their average excess demands are assumed to be governed by
Dct = tanh(aψ
L
t ), where a > 0 is a constant, and ψLt = Pt − maLt defines a trading signal,
the difference between the current price and a moving average (MA) maLt = (1/L)
∑L−1
i=0 Pt−i.
This captures one of the very popular technical trading rules whereby technical analysts wish to
be long (short) when the current price is above (below) the MA. When a is small, the technical
analysts initially react cautiously to the long/short signals, in a sense waiting to confirm the
maintenance of the change in sign of the signal. In this way they minimize the costs incurred
if the signal changes frequently in a short time period. It also captures the limited long/short
positions, risk averting behaviour and traders’ budget constraints.
1A constant fundamental price is assumed for our analysis of the deterministic model, while a random walk fun-
damental price will be introduced for the stochastic version of the model.
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Following the mechanism in [3], we define the fitness functions πf,t, πc,t as the realized net
profits of each group, πf,t = Dft−1(Pt − Pt−1) − Cf , πc,t = Dct−1(Pt − Pt−1) − Cc, where
Cf , Cc ≥ 0 are the costs of the respective strategies. The population fractions are then updated








where Uf,t = πf,t + ηUf,t−1, Uc,t = πc,t + ηUc,t−1. Here β ≥ 0 is the intensity of choice
measuring how quickly agents switch between the two strategies. In particular, if β = 0, there
is no switching between strategies, while for β = ∞ all agents immediately switch to the best
strategy. Through the parameter η the Uf,t, Uc,t are effectively geometrically declining weighted
averages of past realized profits.
Set mt = nf,t − nc,t. Based on the above analysis, the market price of the risky asset is
determined according to





∗ − Pt) + (1−mt) tanh[a(Pt −maLt )]
] (3)






, Ut = [D
f
t−1 −Dct−1][Pt − Pt−1] + ηUt−1, (4)
where C = Cf − Cc will be positive if we assume that the fundamentalists incur greater costs
than the chartists. By setting σt = 0, (3) becomes a nonlinear deterministic equation of the
price





∗ − Pt) + (1−mt) tanh[a(Pt −maLt )]
]
. (5)
The dynamics of the deterministic model (4)-(5) is analyzed in [8]. To guide our analysis
on the price dynamics of the stochastic model, we briefly review the main results in [8]. For
the deterministic model, the fundamental price P ∗ is the unique steady state price and different
lag lengths L of the MA rules play different roles on the stability of the fundamental price.
Intuitively we would expect the fundamentalists to represent a stabilizing force and the activities
of the chartists to destabilize an otherwise stable market price, and an increase of the lag length
might enlarge the stability region. The stability analysis in [8] shows that increasing the lag
length L in the end destabilizes the system in general. This is a very interesting result and the
intuition for this instability result is the following. Chartist demand depends on the difference
between the long-run MA and the current price. As L increases, the MA becomes smoother
and more sluggish. When the relative effect of chartists at the steady state is bigger than that
of fundamentalists, a small change in the price leads to a relatively large increase of chartists
demand to destabilizing the price.
As an illustrative example, Fig. 1 illustrates how the phase plot (in terms of (Pt,mt)) changes
as the lag length L increases, where the fundamental price is locally stable for L = 2, 3, 4, but
it is unstable for L ≥ 5. One can see that, as L increases, the size of the attractor is en-
larged, implying that the deviations of both price and population from the fundamental value
are enlarged. Hence an increase in the MA window L destabilizes the price dynamics. This
destabilizing effect becomes more significant when L is increased further to L = 9, 10, 50 and
the price dynamics become even more complicated for L = 90 and 100, as indicated by the
phase plots in Fig. 1. This demonstrates that for large lag lengths the price can take large ex-
cursion from the fundamental and at turning points in the price, the fraction of fundamentalists/
chartists can change dramatically.
We now use numerical simulations to attempt to gain some insights into the different be-
haviour of the nonlinear stochastic model with stochasticity arising from noise created by the
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FIGURE 1. Phase plots of (mt, Pt) for fixed β = 0.4 and various L =
5, 8, 9, 10, 50, 90 and 100, where α = 1, μ = 2, β = 0.4, η = 0.2, a = 1, C = 0.
noise traders and a noisy fundamental. We assume that the fundamental price follows the ran-
dom walk P ∗t+1 = P ∗t [1 + σδ δt], where σδ ≥ 0 is a constant measuring the volatility of the
return and δt ∼ N (0, 1). Notice that this specification ensures that relative fundamental price
changes are stationary. In addition to a noisy fundamental, we consider two different forms for
D˜t representing noisy excess demand created by noise traders in (1).
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FIGURE 2. Time series, density distributions, and the autocorrelation coef-
ficients (ACs) of the returns, absolute and squared returns for L = 100 and
α = 0.5, β = 0.05, μ = 1, η = 0.2, a = 1, C = 1, σδ = 5%. Here the noise
demand is proportional to the market price D˜t = σ	tPt with σ = 0.5%.
We consider first D˜t = σ	tPt, that is the size of the noise depends on the current market
price. For the given set of parameters, Fig. 2(a) and (d) show that the market price follows
the fundamental price in general, although it is above (below) the fundamental price when the
technical analysts take long (short) positions and the market is dominated by technical analysts.
Most of the time, the fundamentalists and trend followers take opposite positions. However,
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following the cross-overs of the market price and the moving average, there are very short
transition periods where they both take the same position. This immediately pushes the market
price away from the fundamental price over long time periods (close to 100 days). This is
clearly indicated by the bi-model distribution of the difference pt − p∗t in Fig. 2 (b). In fact,
this bi-model distribution feature is robust for various combinations of parameters and noise
sizes and is dominated by the bi-model distribution of the underlying price dynamics of the
deterministic model. In addition, it is found from Fig. 2 (e)-(i) that the returns rt are close
to being normally distributed with no significant autocorrelation coefficients (ACs) for the raw
returns, the absolute and squared returns. This means that the market can appear to be quite
efficient even though it is dominated by technical analysts and the market price is consistently
pushed away from the fundamental price. This is a very interesting observation. We would
suggest that Fig. 2 provides a basis for the existence of upper and lower price resistance levels
in an apparent efficient market. These resistance levels are often referred to in the practitioner

















































FIGURE 3. Time series, density distributions, and the autocorrelation coef-
ficients (ACs) of the returns, absolute and squared returns for L = 100 and
α = 0.5, β = 0.05, μ = 1, η = 0.2, a = 1, C = 1, σδ = 20%. Here the noise
demand is independent from the market price D˜t = σ	t with σ = 1.
An important stylized fact of financial markets is that of long memory. This is characterized
by insignificant ACs for the raw returns but significant ACs for the absolute and squared returns.
It would be interesting to know if the model is able to generate such long memory behaviour.
We now consider the second form of the noisy demand D˜t = σ	t, which is independent from
the market price. With this choice, Fig. 3 illustrates the corresponding time series, distributions,
and ACs for σδ = 20% for a fixed σ = 1 (which is about 1% of the fundamental value). In
this case, the bi-model distribution observed in Fig. 2 (b) disappears. For small σδ, for example
5%, it is found that the fundamental price is less volatile and the market returns are close to a
normal distribution. However, for σδ = 20%, the fundamental price is more volatile, and Fig.
3 shows a non-normal distribution of the market returns with some skewness and high kurtosis.
Furthermore, the AC patterns of the market returns in Fig. 3 (B) (g)-(i) show insignificant ACs
for the returns but significant ACs for the absolute and squared returns. This indicates, when the
noisy demand is independent from the market price, a high volatility of the fundamental price
can reduce the market efficiency, generate the long memory feature as well as the skewness and
kurtosis observed in asset returns.
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Based on the analysis above, we observe some interesting phenomena. (i) When the fun-
damental price follows a stochastic process, the market price closely follows the fundamental
price. (ii) The switching between bull and bear markets happens when both types of traders
take the same position, a very intuitive result. (iii) Different forms of the noise demand created
by the noise traders can have a different impact on the price dynamics. When the noise trader
demand is proportional to the market price, the price dynamics are dominated by the under-
lying price dynamics of the deterministic model. In addition, the market can appear efficient
even though the market is dominated by technical analysts and the market price is consistently
pushed away from the fundamental price. When the noise trader demand is independent of the
market price, some stylized facts, including skewness, high kurtosis, and possible long mem-
ory, can be generated when the volatility of the fundamental price is high. In future research on
models of the type presented here there is a need to analyse in more depth the interaction of the
non-linear and stochastic elements.
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